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Ronald V ClarkeAbstract
Background: This paper describes the work undertaken over many years by the author and colleagues concerning
the role of opportunity in crime. The work began in the early 1970s in the Home Office Research Unit, the British
government’s criminological research department.
Discussions: The work supported a preventive approach – situational crime prevention – that was highly contentious
in the criminology of the day because it sought to reduce opportunities for crime, rather than to modify offender
propensities. Critics claimed that situational crime prevention would displace rather than reduce crime because they
assumed that opportunity merely determines the time and place of crime, but does not cause it.
Summary: This paper describes the difficulties in establishing that opportunity is cause of crime and why this took so
long. It reviews the research that was undertaken to this end, and it summarizes the benefits for criminology and crime
policy of accepting that opportunity does cause crime.
Keywords: Crime causation, Situational crime prevention, Opportunity theory, The rational choice perspective, Routine
activities theory, Environmental criminology, Administrative criminologistsIntroduction
This paper describes the work on opportunity and crime
since it was put on the agenda some 35 years ago in
the Home Office publication, Crime as Opportunity
(Mayhew et al. 1976). As described by Hough and
Mayhew (2011, this work began in the early 1970s, when
the two of them and I were employed in the Home Office
Research Unit. In this paper, I will focus on a question
that pre-occupied us then and later: Is opportunity a
cause of crime? The question was unavoidable because if
opportunity is a cause, then reducing it could be
expected to reduce crime without displacing it; if oppor-
tunity merely determined when and where crime oc-
curred, but did not cause it, then the expected result of
reducing opportunity would simply be to displace it.
Despite its importance, no attempt was made to
resolve this question in Crime as Opportunity, but
twenty-two years later Felson and I felt able to claim
that opportunity is a cause of crime (see Opportunity
Makes the Thief, Felson and Clarke, 1998). This change
needs some explanation and this paper addresses four
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in any medium, provided the original work is p1. Why did Crime as Opportunity published in 1976 avoid
making the claim that opportunity is cause of crime?
2. What had changed by the time that Opportunity
makes the Thief was published in 1998?
3. What has happened since claiming that opportunity
causes crime?
4. What has been achieved by the work on opportunity
and crime – i.e. “So what”?
Why did Crime as Opportunity (1976) not claim that
opportunity is a cause of crime?
The short answer to this question is that the reason was
a mixture of conceptual confusion and timidity. Regarding
the latter, to have claimed that opportunity is a cause of
crime would have gone quite contrary to the criminology
of the day, which was heavily dispositional (it still is).
This dispositional bias can be traced back to Sutherland,
a sociologist, often described as the father of criminology.
In his introduction to Principles of Criminology (3rd ed.
Sutherland (1947)), he expressed the opinion:
“The problem in criminology is to explain the
criminality of behavior, not the behavior, as such”
(page 4). . ..The situation operates in many ways, of
which perhaps the least important is the provision of
an opportunity for a criminal act” (page 5).n Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly cited.
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ogists, most of whom like Sutherland were also so-
ciologists, but it flouted a fundamental principle of
psychology: behavior is the product of the interaction
between environment and organism. In criminological
terms, this can be expressed as “crime is the result of an
interaction between a motivated offender and a criminal
opportunity”. The importance of taking this principle
seriously b had been brought home to me by the results
of a study of absconding from training schools (Clarke
and Martin 1971). This found that absconding was bet-
ter explained by the environments and regimes of the
training school, which facilitated and provoked abscond-
ing, than by absconders’ personalities and backgrounds.
The study therefore showed not just that situational op-
portunities and provocations to abscond were important
explanatory factors, but they appeared to be more im-
portant than dispositional factors.
Before proceeding it should be noted that Sutherland
in fact recanted his views about the role in crime played
by opportunity and situation in a little-known unpub-
lished paper, “The Swansong of Differential Association”
(his theory of crime causation), which was later issued in
a collection of his writings (Cohen et al. 1956). c The
paper included the following passage:
“One factor in criminal behavior that is at least
partially extraneous to differential association is
opportunity. Criminal behavior is partially a function
of opportunities to commit specific classes of crime,
such as embezzlement, bank burglary or illicit
heterosexual intercourse. Opportunities to commit
crimes of these classes are partially a function of
physical factors and of cultures which are neutral as
to crime. Consequently, criminal behavior is not
caused entirely by association with criminal and anti-
criminal patterns, and differential association is not a
sufficient cause of criminal behavior.” (Sutherland,
1956:31, quoted by Merton, 1995: 38).
Unfortunately, we were not aware of this retraction
when we wrote Crime as Opportunity. In addition, we
found it difficult to muster unambiguous evidence sup-
porting our views about the role of opportunity in crime.
d The absconding work mentioned above had gone un-
noticed by criminology and, because it dealt with institu-
tional misbehavior, would hardly be convincing as the
basis for generalizing about all crime. The same could
be said of Mischel’s (1968) psychological studies and the
Studies in Deceit published by Hartshorne and May
(1928) work that we cited. The former studies estab-
lished that behavior could not be reliably predicted from
personality test scores because it was heavily determined
by situational factors, while the latter work showed thatwhether children cheated on tests or behaved dishonestly
depended mostly on situational variables such as the
risks of being found out. In both cases, there was a con-
siderable stretch between our thesis on opportunity and
Mischel’s findings (too abstract) and those of Hartshorne
and May (relating to minor juvenile transgressions in
artificial settings). e
Finally, the two empirical studies included in Crime as
Opportunity provided only mixed support for the causal
role of opportunity. The first study showed that double-
deck buses suffered more vandalism on the front upper
deck and other parts of the bus that could not be easily
supervised by the bus crew. Strictly speaking, this
showed only that lack of supervision determined the
vandal’s choice of where to target. The second study
examined the effect on car theft of the compulsory fit-
ting of steering column locks in England and Germany.
In England, only new cars were fitted with the locks with
the result, consistent with dispositional theory, that
thefts were displaced to older cars without the locks. In
Germany, all cars, new and old were fitted with the
locks. This ruled out displacement with the result, con-
sistent with situational theory, of an immediate and sus-
tained decline in theft of cars. To us these results were
not in conflict, but to our critics they were seen as pro-
viding support for either side of the argument about the
role of opportunity in crime.
Apart from these strands of evidence, two books pub-
lished in the early 1970s gave us some encouragement –
Jeffery (1971) Crime Prevention through Environmental
Design, which argued that criminologists had neglected
the biological and physical determinants of crime (in-
cluding opportunity), and Oscar Newman’s (1972) De-
fensible Space, which claimed that the high crime levels
of public housing projects in the United States were due
as much to the criminogenic designs of the projects as
to the nature of the residents. Unfortunately, neither
book proved helpful to the argument that opportunity
was a neglected cause of crime because they were both
given short shrift by criminological reviewers – Jeffery’s
because of his views about the biological causation of
crime and Newman’s because of its anthropomorphic
conception of human “territoriality” and shortcomings
in its statistical analyses (Newman was an architect, not
a social researcher).
Thus, the lack of clear supporting evidence is one rea-
son why Crime as Opportunity did not make the case
that opportunity is a cause of crime, but another was the
widespread belief at the time that social science could
not establish causal relationships. This led us – me in
particular – into a confusing exploration of the notion
of cause in social science. I was impressed by Barbara
Wootton’s (1950) argument about the infinitely regres-
sive nature of cause:
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phenomena simply resolves itself into a long process
of “explaining” one association in terms of another. If
a person becomes ill with what are known as diabetic
symptoms, we measure the sugar-content of his
blood. If this is higher than that found in people not
exhibiting such symptoms, we say that the high sugar
content is the cause of the illness. .. this in turn is said
to be “explained” by a failure of the pancreas to
function normally. . ... And so on with one law of
association following another..” (page 18).
This argument, made by a greatly respected social
scientist, f led me to think that it would be impossible to
claim that opportunity was a cause of crime without
becoming entangled in endless philosophical arguments,
and I turned instead to the notion of necessary and
sufficient conditions. Once again, I spent sleepless hours
trying to decide whether opportunity was a necessary or
a sufficient cause of crime, becoming confused about the
meanings of each, and then deciding that sorting one
from the other would still not allow us to claim that
opportunity was a cause of crime.
A further deterrent was that to claim that opportunity
caused crime would require us to define opportunity.
Here again the difficulties seemed overwhelming. Any
definition would have to take account of the fact that
opportunities are highly crime specific – those that
“cause” bank robbery are quite different from those that
cause rape. In addition, for any crime, opportunities
occur at several levels of aggregation. To take residential
burglary as an example, a macro level, societal-level
cause might be that many homes are left unguarded in
the day because most people now work away from home
(cf. Cohen and Felson 1979). A meso-level, neighbor-
hood cause could be that many homes in poor public
housing estates once used coin-fed fuel meters which
offered tempting targets for burglars (as found in Kirkholt,
Pease 1991). A micro-level level cause, determining the
choices made by a burglar, could be a poorly secured door.
Finally, at any particular level of explanation, for any
specific crime, the opportunities are vast. For example
micro-level opportunities include not just an unlocked
door, but an open window, an isolated location, bushes
that provide cover, signs of wealth, etc.
A final reason for avoiding the controversial claim that
opportunity was a cause of crime was that we were not
university scientists, with the authority implied by that
status, but government researchers. Worse we were what
came to be called administrative criminologists, uncritic-
ally serving our civil service masters, though as it
proved, many of these masters were as skeptical about
situational prevention as most academics of the time
proved to be.What had changed by the time that Opportunity makes
the Thief was published in 1998?
Twenty-two years after the publication of Crime as Op-
portunity, Felson and I finally asserted in Opportunity
Makes the Thief (Felson and Clarke, 1998) that oppor-
tunity is a cause of crime. What took so long? The ex-
planation begins with the reception given to Crime as
Opportunity, which was generally dismissed (more in
conversation than in print) as irrelevant, simplistic and
atheoretical. The first review, which concludes with the
following sentences, gives a flavor of this reaction:
“Now that the criminological kitchen is becoming so
hot, it is as if the (Home Office) Research Unit is
looking for a nice, quiet, simple, and nonpolitical
corner. It is a touching, if unworldly idea – like
playing with one's toes. But it won’t catch on.”
(Beeson, 1976: 20).
The publication was also criticized for denying the
influence of the “root causes” of crime – maternal
deprivation, subculture, relative deprivation and anomie –
that criminologists had so patiently documented over the
years. The fact that our critics felt little inhibition in
claiming that their theories were causal in nature meant
that our caution had been wasted. This strengthened our
resolve to be more assertive about the causal role of
opportunity, but this only became possible much later as
a consequence of the following developments:
1. Quite soon after the publication of Crime as
Opportunity, we found we were not alone in our
views: Cohen and Felson (1979) and the
Brantingham and Brantingham (1981) working
respectively in the United States and Canada, had
persuasively argued that explaining crime involved
not merely explaining criminal dispositions but also
explaining the role of immediate circumstance and
situations.
2. In order to underpin situational prevention, Cornish
and I developed the rational choice perspective
(Clarke and Cornish 1985; Cornish and Clarke 1986).
While this was also heavily criticized (cf. Clarke (In
Press)), it should have been clear that the theory
underlying Crime as Opportunity was far from
simple-minded.
3. Some helpful theoretical work on causation began to
appear in the years after the publication of Crime as
Opportunity. Felson cut through our prevarications
about free-will and determinism in the original
formulation of the rational choice perspective (Clarke
and Cornish 1985) by declaring that: “People make
choices, but they cannot choose the choices available












Table 2 Suicides in England and Wales, 1958-1977
Year Total suicides Suicides by domestic gas Percent of total
1958 5,298 2,637 49.8
1959 5,207 2,594 49.8
1960 5,112 2,499 48.9
1961 5,200 2,379 45.8
1962 5,588 2,469 44.2
1963 5,714 2,368 41.4
1964 5,566 2,088 37.5
1965 5,161 1,702 33.0
1966 4,994 1,593 31.9
1967 4,711 1,336 28.4
1968 4,584 988 21.6
1969 4,326 790 18.3
1970 3,940 511 13.0
1971 3,945 346 8.8
1972 3,770 197 5.2
1973 3,823 143 3.7
1974 3,899 50 1.3
1975 3,693 23 0.6
1976 3,816 14 0.4
1977 3,944 8 0.2
Source: Clarke and Mayhew (1988).
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crime, with the rider that, as a near cause,
opportunity had a more powerful and immediate
effect on crime than criminal dispositions formed
many years before. Distinguishing between near and
far causes provided a solution to Barbara Wootton’s
problem of infinitely regressive causes. Tilley
reinforced Ekblom’s position by insisting that the
mechanisms through which a cause was supposed to
exert its effect should always be clearly specified
(cf. Tilley and Laycock 2002). This again favored
opportunities over dispositions because the causal
mechanisms of situation and opportunities were so
much shorter and easier to chart. Following a
different line of argument, but one that endorsed the
practical value of focusing on reducing crime
opportunities, James Q Wilson (1975) stated that if
criminologists persisted in framing theories in terms
of “causes” that could not be changed (e.g. maternal
deprivation or relative deprivation), they would be
consigned to policy irrelevance.
4. A number of studies were published during this
period providing strong evidence about the causal
role of opportunity, several of which I undertook
with Pat Mayhew. First, we showed in Mayhew et al.
(1989) that the introduction of helmet laws in
various countries had a dramatic effect in reducing
theft of motorcycles, apparently because motorcycle
thefts were frequently unplanned which meant that
opportunistic thieves would be immediately noticed
when riding past without a helmet. Table 1 shows
data from Germany where the laws were
progressively enforced, having been first brought
into effect in 1980. The table shows that motor
cycle thefts were greatly reduced with little if any
consistent evidence of displacement to car or
bicycle thefts.
Second, we showed (Clarke and Mayhew 1988), that
the 35% decline in numbers of suicides occurring in
England and Wales between 1958 and 1977 was
caused by a progressive reduction in the poisonousble 1 Thefts of motorcycles, cars and bicycles in
ermany
ar Motorcycles Cars Bicycles
80 153,153 64,131 358,865
81 143,317 71,916 410,223
82 134,735 78,543 453,850
83 118,550 82,211 415,398
84 90,008 72,170 376,946
85 73,442 69,659 337,337
86 54,208 70,245 301,890
urce: Mayhew et al. 1989.carbon monoxide content of domestic gas.
(See Table 2). These reductions resulted from cost-
saving measures and were brought about, first, by a
change in manufacture from coal-based to oil-based
gas and then the substitution of natural gas from the
North Sea which contained no carbon monoxide.
Suicides by domestic gas which accounted for 50% of
the deaths at the beginning of the period were virtually
eliminated by the end of the period and their decline
precisely tracked, year-by-year, the decline in the
carbon monoxide content of domestic gas – strong
evidence of a causal relationship. There was little
displacement to other methods of suicide when
domestic gas was detoxified, presumably because these
methods were more difficult, painful or distasteful.
Third, in the same publication we sought to explain
why rates of homicide were eight times greater in the
United States than in England and Wales during the
mid-1980s, when rates for most other crimes differed
little between the two countries. This difference was
the result of a much higher rate of gun homicides in
the United States, particularly handgun homicides,
which in turn was due to much higher levels of gun
ownership – a situational variable – in that country
than in England and Wales. g
Fourth, using data from the British Crime Survey,
we showed (Clarke and Mayhew, 1998) that risks of
Clarke Crime Science 2012, 1:3 Page 5 of 9
http://www.crimesciencejournal.com/content/1/1/3car theft in public car parks were eleven times
greater than when cars were parked for the same
length of time in the owner’s driveway and 225
times greater than when parked in the owner’s
garage. These large differences in risk seemed to us
to be strong evidence that the low risk of stealing
cars from parking lots caused theft and did not
merely facilitate it.
5. The motorcycle helmet study and the suicide study
were just two of the many studies that appeared
during the period showing that the risks of
displacement had been exaggerated. This was
confirmed in a review of these studies by Eck (1993)
and by Hesseling (1994) who reported that no
displacement was found in many studies and that,
when found, the number of crimes displaced were
many fewer than those prevented. Hesseling also
reported the encouraging finding of his review that
“diffusion of benefits” (Clarke and Weisburd 1994),
where crime reductions are found beyond the
intended reach of opportunity-reduction measures,
was a common result of situational prevention. h
6. Apart from the specific pieces of research mentioned
above, there was remarkable growth in scholarly
activity concerned with opportunity-reduction.
Under Gloria Laycock’s leadership, the Crime
Prevention Unit in the Home Office and
subsequently the Police Research Group published
some 150 relevant reports. i In the United States,
Crime Prevention Studies, a book series devoted to
situational crime prevention, had issued 8 volumes
by 1998. The first edition of Felson (1994)/Crime and
Everyday Life, which has sold many thousands of
copies, and which has done more than any other
publication to disseminate findings about the role of
opportunity in crime, was published in the United
States. Finally, the establishment in 1992 of the
annual meetings of the Environmental Crime and
Crime Analysis (ECCA) group has served to build a
world-wide network of scholars interested in the
situational determinants of crime.
The developments listed above had transformed the
evidential base for asserting the powerful role of oppor-
tunity in crime. Consequently, Felson and I readily
agreed to Gloria Laycock’s request made in 1998 to write
a paper arguing that opportunity was a cause of crime. If
published in the Police Research Series as intended, she
believed the paper would materially help in persuading
police and local authorities to make more use of situ-
ational prevention. Without resolving the philosophical
issues around the concept of cause, we simply decided
to assert in Opportunity Makes the Thief that opportun-
ity is an important cause of crimeAfter Opportunity Makes the Thief
Much has happened after publication of Opportunity
Makes the Thief to reinforce these claims about the role
of opportunity in crime.
Valuable studies have continued to accumulate on dis-
placement and diffusion of benefits, including one show-
ing that the installation of 3178 lockable gates to restrict
access to alleys behind row houses in Liverpool saved
£1.86 in costs of residential burglary for every £ spent
on the gates during the first year after installation. There
was little apparent displacement but clear evidence of a
diffusion of benefits to nearby streets without the gates
(Bowers et al. 2004) and these benefits were sustained in
later years (Armitage and Smithson 2007). Another
strong study, undertaken in the United States, showed
that system modifications made by cell phone companies
eliminated a problem of cell phone cloning that at its
height in 1996 had cost as much as $800 million in one
year. There was no evidence of displacement to the sec-
ond most common form of cell phone fraud, acquiring
cell phone service through the presentation of false ID
(Clarke et al. 2001). These studies were included in an
important review published in Criminology, the disci-
pline’s leading journal, of 102 situational prevention
studies. This review found that: (1) no displacement was
found in 68 of the studies; (2) when found, displacement
was never complete and (3) diffusion of benefits oc-
curred in 39 of the studies (Guerette and Bowers 2009).
The period has also seen useful additions to the theory
underlying situational crime prevention, perhaps the
most important of which was Wortley’s (1997, 2001)
argument that situations are not just passive providers
of opportunities for crime, but they can also precipitate
crime j . His careful enumeration of the many ways that
this can occur led to an expansion of the frequently cited
classification of situational prevention techniques which,
thanks to his work, now number 25 (Cornish and Clarke
2003). Felson’s concept of guardianship has stimulated
considerable research effort, notably in terms of Eck’s
(2003) “double crime triangle”, the inspiration for the
Center for Problem-oriented Policing’s logo. k Cornish’s
(1994) introduction of the concept of crime scripts, that
assists in laying out the various stages of a crime (from
planning, commission and escape, and through even
later stages of covering tracks and disposing of stolen
goods) has stimulated a considerable volume of work,
particularly on complex crimes such as internet child
pornography (Wortley and Smallbone 2006), suicide bomb-
ings (Clarke and Newman 2006), and organized crimes of
various kinds (Tremblay et al. 2001; Bullock et al. 2010;
Chiu et al. 2011). This work has shown that situational
crime prevention is applicable not just to “opportunistic”
street crimes, but potentially to every form of crime, how-
ever complex, and however determined the offenders.
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unremarked outside the small circle of environmental
criminologists directly involved in this work. Garland
(2001) argued in a widely read book on criminology and
public policy that opportunity theory (or what he called
the “criminologies of everyday life”) had been more in-
fluential in recent decades than any other criminological
approach, though this was disputed by Young (2003),
the originator of the term “administrative criminology”,
in an unusually long review essay (Young 2003). Judged
by various government White Papers and other reports,
the latest of which is The Government’s Approach to
Crime Prevention (Home Affairs Committee, 2010), situ-
ational crime prevention has directly contributed to
crime policy thinking in the United Kingdom, if not also
in some other European countries. To date, however,
situational prevention has made relatively little impression
on American criminology, perhaps because American
criminology is focused even more strongly on disposi-
tional theory than the criminology of other countries. But
even this might change: Cullen, a former president of
the American Society of Criminology and redoubtable
dispositional theorist, made the following remarks on
recently being nominated for the Society’s premier
award: l “If you have not heard of ECCA, it means
that you likely know nothing about crime – but you
should.” Cullen (2011): 314.
ECCA’s growing influence is one example of the
growth in the institutional strength of environmental
criminology. ECCA members have promoted teaching of
environmental criminology in their universities, includ-
ing Huddersfield and Loughborough in the U.K, Twente
University and the NSCR in Holland, Griffiths University
in Queensland, Simon Fraser University in Canada, and
in the United States, Rutgers, University of Cincinnati,
Temple University, and, finally, Texas State at San
Marcos, where Felson has recently joined Rossmo and
other environmental criminologists.
Another important example of growing institutional
strength is the rise to prominence of the Popcenter,
the web-site (www.popcenter.org) of the Center for
Problem-oriented Policing which is funded by the U.S.
Department of Justice. In the ten years of its existence
Popcenter has become an indispensable resource for
those involved in problem-oriented policing and situ-
ational crime prevention. More than 80,000 files per
month are downloaded from the website, equally by
students and police officers.
The jewel in the crown of the emerging empire in
crime science, for me, however, is the Jill Dando Insti-
tute of Crime Science, founded at University College
London, through the combined efforts of Nick Ross (the
former presenter of Crimewatch, the BBC television pro-
gram) and Ken Pease. From its modest beginnings someten years ago when it consisted of little more than its
director, Gloria Laycock, a trust fund, a secretary and
box of books it has grown to a formidable Institute
within UCL’s faculty of engineering, with more than
thirty staff members and Ph.D. students.
What has been achieved by the work on opportunity and
crime – that is to say, “So what”?
As a result of the developments listed above, it is possible
to make much bolder claims for the role of opportunity in
crime, as follows:
1. Criminally-disposed people will commit more crimes
if they encounter more criminal opportunities.
2. Regularly encountering such opportunities can lead
these people to seek even more opportunities.
3. At the point of deciding to commit a crime,
opportunity plays a more important role that
dispositions.
4. The existence of easy opportunities for crime enables
some people to lead a life of crime.
5. People without pre-existing dispositions can be drawn
into criminal behaviour by a proliferation of criminal
opportunities, and generally law-abiding people can be
drawn into committing specific forms of crime if they
regularly encounter easy opportunities for these crimes,
especially in their occupations.
6. The more opportunities for crime that exist, the
more crime there will be.
7. Reducing opportunities for specific forms of crime
will reduce the overall amount of crime.
While consistent with available evidence, it must be
acknowledged that the evidence supporting these claims
needs to be strengthened. However, the final and perhaps
most important claim is supported by Van Dijk et al’s.
(2012) edited volume whose contributors collectively argue
that improved security is the best explanation for the recent
declines in crime in most Western countries. If their thesis
holds it will have a profound influence on criminological
theory and crime policy. For the remaining claims, doubters
might consider the following:
“Suppose all situational controls were abandoned: no
locks, no custom controls, cash left for parking in an
open pot for occasional collection, no library checkouts,
no baggage screening at airports, no ticket checks at
train stations, no traffic lights, etc. Would there be no
change in the volume of crime and disorder? (Tilley and
Laycock, 2002:31).
Conclusions
It is difficult to sum up the contributions made to crimin-
ology and crime policy by the work on opportunity– and
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portant strands of environmental criminology. It can be
argued, however, that the work has contributed to four
major achievements:
1. It has supported the development of situational
crime prevention, a highly effective means of crime
control.
2. It has helped make credible the claim that the
cumulative effect of situational prevention, whether
or not implemented under that label, has brought
about widespread drops in crime in Western
countries.
3. It has helped to clarify that most criminological
theories are theories of criminality not theories of
crime – in other words, criminological theorizing has
been preoccupied with the question of why certain
individuals or groups become involved in crime and
not the question of why crime occurs. This latter
question cannot be answered simply by explaining
why some people are more likely to be delinquent or
criminal; it must also be explained how situational
factors facilitate or encourage the actual commission
of criminal acts.
4. It has supported the development of an alternative
set of crime (or opportunity) theories that will enable
the growth of crime science.
Final word
My professional quest to persuade skeptical crimino-
logical colleagues of the commonsense truth of an
everyday saying about crime – opportunity makes the
thief – might seem quixotic, but I believe this work will
free crime scientists (who have taken on the mantle
of opportunity-reduction) from the problem of cause
and enable them to address other challenges facing
them. These will include developing more comprehen-
sive crime opportunity theories and more detailed mod-
els of crime. Indeed, it is entirely to be expected that
crime scientists, who now have an established place in
academia, will increasingly engage in these kinds of
theoretical endeavors that serve academia’s interests. In
concluding, therefore, I cannot help but express the wish
that abstract theorizing and model building will not di-
vert crime scientists too far away from the pragmatic,
problem solving work of reducing crime, piece by piece.
While this might have less academic caché, in my view it
should always be the real goal of crime science.
Endnotes
a. This paper reviews the work of environmental crim-
inologists, but only to the extent needed to answer these
questions. Much of their important and interesting work
is therefore not covered.b. It is not that criminologists were unaware of this
principle, but they have regarded it as a truism or a
“platitude” (Cohen, 1985: 223) that does not assist in
explaining who becomes delinquent or criminal.
c. Thanks to Derek Cornish for recently drawing this
to my attention.
d. We did find support from a highly unexpected source,
The New Criminology (Taylor et al. 1973: 61), the bible of
deviancy sociology: “Men rob banks because they believe
they may enrich themselves, not because something bio-
logically propels them through the door . . . "
e. Pease and Laycock (2011) point out that Crime as
Opportunity failed to mention some important psycho-
logical experiments – in particular Zimbardo’s (Haney
et al. 1973) simulated prison experiments and Milgram’s
(1974) studies in obedience – showing that deviant be-
havior is heavily influenced by situational factors. Again,
these studies were rarely cited in the criminological lit-
erature and, for us, they differed importantly from our
work on opportunity: the psychological experiments
were investigating the effect of pressure to behave
cruelly in a laboratory setting, while our studies were
concerned with the extent to which opportunity pas-
sively provides the occasion for committing any kind of
crime in the real world.
f. Barbara Wootton was not just an outstanding social
scientist but she was also remarkably independent in her
views. This is revealed by her musings as a magistrate when
faced during World War II with a decision to commit an
“exceptionally beautiful” 16-year old girl to custodial care
for accepting money for sleeping with American airmen: “I
just could not persuade myself that a night or two a week
with a personable American was so immensely more de-
grading than 40 hours or more unskilled and uninteresting
work in a factory” (Wootton (1978):158).
g. Numerous more comprehensive studies have docu-
mented the relationship between homicide and gun
availability (e.g. Cook and Ludwig 2002).
h. Strictly-speaking the findings about displacement
showed only that situational crime prevention is effect-
ive, not that opportunity is a cause of crime. But they
did help to counter the argument that opportunity and
situational factors determine only the time and place of
crime, not whether or not it occurs. This was because
the results showed that reducing opportunities through
situational prevention measures did reduce the amount
of crime that occurred.
i. One of the most important of these was Farrell and
Pease (1993) that set out the evidence for repeat
victimization. Reducing repeat victimisation was subse-
quently established by the Home Office as an official
measure of police performance.
j. Nick Ross has continually reminded me that temptation,
not merely opportunity, plays a substantial role in crime.
Clarke Crime Science 2012, 1:3 Page 8 of 9
http://www.crimesciencejournal.com/content/1/1/3k. The double crime triangle was created to help police
analyze crime problems and identify possible solutions.
The three sides of the inner triangle are labeled offender,
place and target/victim, while the three sides of the
outer triangle are labeled with three controlling agents:
“handlers” control offenders, “place managers” protect
places, and “guardians protect target/victims.
l. It is enjoyable irony for me that this is called the
“Sutherland Award”. Cullen’s endorsement of ECCA
might not be entirely unrelated to the fact that he and
John Eck are colleagues at the University of Cincinnati.
They are also friends and live across the street from each
other. It was ever thus that personal contacts have chan-
neled the flow of knowledge!
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